
Monuments on Mansu Hill in winter
U.S. Intelligence believes that North Korea may have produced 1-2 nuclear weapons before the 1994 Agreed Framework. Work on new weapons has accelerated recently, with experts estimating that the country could produce enough fissile material for more nuclear weapons in the coming months.
North Korea possesses 12 chemical weapons facilities, producing 4 500 tons of chemical weapons per year, with wartime production capacity estimated at 12 000 tons per year. North Korea has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and has stationed artillery systems capable of effectively delivering chemical weapons near the DMZ (and within range of Seoul).
Though North Korea has signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1987, is is believed to have a biological weapons program dating from either the the early 1980s (NTI) or the 1960s (CIA) that has produced anthrax bacteria, botulinum toxin, and plague bacteria.

Image of an American soldier from a booth at the Taesong Funfair for children to throw wooden bullets through
The above weapons are North Korea’s own versions of SCUD missiles, originally developed by the USSR in the 1960s to deliver nuclear or conventional warheads distances of up to 290km (180 miles). SCUD missiles are direct descendants of German V-2 rockets developed in the 1930s. North Korea has deployed 600 of these missiles, among them perhaps 100 Nodongs.
In current development is the Taepodong-2, which is believed to have intercontinental range and may already be ready for testing. U.S. Intelligence reports predict that North Korea will have ICBMs capable of reaching the U.S. By 2015. If left in its current state as a 2-stage missile it is predicted to have 10 000km range, capable of reaching Alaska, Haiwai, and parts of the continental U.S. If it is developed into a 3-stage missile like the Taepodong-1 this range would be extended to 15 000km, capable of reaching the entire continental U.S. As in the case of the 1998 flight test of the Taepodong-1, it is expected that flight tests would occur with the ostensible goal of launching a satellite into orbit.
After the 1998 flight test of the Taepodoing-1, North Korea agreed in 1999 to a moratorium on flight tests through 2002 that was later extended into 2003.

A march in Pyongyang
North Korea has been willing to sell and trade its weapons technologies to interested states. As a source of hard currency, North Korea has sold weapons systems and components to Egypt, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, and Yemen. Most notable are its exchanges with Pakistan and Iran because of the instability of these governments and their effect on regional conflicts. In the case of Pakistan, knowledge of an exchange of highly enriched uranium for Nodong missiles in the late 1990s was the impetus that launched the current nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and North Korea. In the case of Iran, North Korean provided information allowing for a home-grown missile development program that produced the Shahab-3, the Iranian equivalent to the Nodong (Iran, in turn, is now selling the system to other countries.
Most recently, North Korean shipments to Yemen caused a political row when, in December 2002, U.S. and Spanish naval forces intercepted a North Korean ship carrying Scud missiles and a chemical used in Scud missile fuel. As Pakistan and Yemen are key U.S. allies in the so-called “War on Terrorism,” their choice of cheaper and more freely distributed North Korea weapons over U.S. systems comes as an embarrassment. The December transfers to Yemen are particularly poignant in light of U.S. sanctions against North Korea and protests toward Yemen for similar transfers in August, 2002.