With NATO invitations-to-join most likely going out this summer to the "Visegrad Four" (Czech Rep., Slovakia, Hungary and Poland), Russia's main concern is that of NATO military forces moving into these new member states. Military security has always been Russia's key point of contention with NATO expansion. In 1993 the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service issued a report entitled "Prospects for the Expansion of NATO and Russia's Interests". The section of this report concerning military aspects contained the following item:

The fact that, as a result of the expansion of NATO, its military grouping -- the largest in the world, one that possesses colossal offensive potential -- would bring its frontiers into direct proximity to Russia'a borders, which would require a fundamental rethinking of all defensive concepts, a restructuring of the Armed Forces, revisions in the current assignment of theaters of military operations, the development of an additional infrastructure, the redeployment of major troop contingents, and changes in operational plans and in the nature of combat training. From the standpoint of the military, these measures are an objective necessity and would have to be carried out regardless of the fact that in a political sense NATO is no longer regarded as an adversary . . .(included in A. Poleshchuk, p. 12)

This reflects the Russian position that NATO expansion would necessarily lead to military build-up. As this Russian position and the NATO position have both proven unlikely to merge, NATO General Secretary J. Solana and Russian President B. Yeltsin will need to establish a relationship through which Russia can feel secure with NATO expansion. This relationship will most likely develop in the form of a "binding document". From the Russian perspective, such an agreement would need the following points:

Nondeployment of nuclear weapons. Russia wants a formal commitment from NATO not to deploy or prepare to deploy nuclear weapons in Europe. "Nondeployment is an absolutely necessary condition for normal relations between the two sides. For this reason, . . . it should be codified and spelled out in an appropriate document . . .," suggests one Russian columnist (Pushkov, 9).

Nondeployment of alliance troop contingents. Russian concern is not so much that NATO troops never go into expanded territory, but that their mission be clear. Pushkov suggests that these troops and "necessary structures for . . . the performance of peacekeeping functions" should not involve "powerful military infrastructures," (ibid., 9-10).

"A mechanism for cooperation between Russia and NATO" Russia feels the need to have some say in the administration of any expanded political-military structure in Europe; especially one that would affect its security. In recent talks (OSCE Lisbon '96, NATO Brussels '96) Russia has been in a "16 + 1" relationship with NATO -- the sixteen NATO members plus Russia in a consultative role. However, Russia would prefer to have more like a veto power. (This, by the way, is unlikely)

According to Pushkov, the final two parts of a "binding document" would be cooperation on dealing with crisis situations and "joint peacekeeping". Both of these stipulations create a certain sense of equality between Russian and NATO forces. Participation in future NATO projects is important for Russia and vital for a sense of security in Russian minds (ibid., 10).

These are the items upon which the basis of Russian policy towards NATO expansion stand. Russian Federation President's Chief of Staff Anatoly Chubais stated his belief in the gravity of this situation:

I think that if Western politicians and Russian politicians can prepare and sign this agreement before NATO's July meeting [in Madrid] this would be the only chance of minimizing the threat caused by the Western leaders' decision to expand the bloc." (in Sedykh, 11).

A final issue Russia would like to see in an agreement between NATO and itself is the future of the Baltic states. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia have long had tense relations with Russia. In the early stages of the fall of the Soviet empire, the Baltic states were the first to be free of Soviet domination. Having NATO in the Baltics would bring that Western bloc too close for Russian comfort. It would also completely surround the province of Kaliningrad. In a brief interview with the Russian news periodical PRAVDA, Foreign Minister Y. Primakov spoke about the prospect of the Baltics pursuing a relationship with NATO: "As soon as the Balts took such a path in Brussels, our dealings with NATO would be over. . . It goes without saying that additional defensive measures would also have to be taken." (in Bogmolov, 19).

Russia has taken a generally conservative line in dealing with the expansion of a previously adversarial military alliance. Russia's involvement has been largely at the state level, where matters of international security usually are. They have opposed change as vehemently as possible, fearing that advancement of NATO implies Western malice. Russia also has upheld the society as the goal of any work to secure safety and future security. This world view suggests that Russia will (as shown above) push for a resolution of its wrestling with NATO in a way that will maintain its sovereignty as a state actor, not create great change in the status quo, and continue to strive for improvement in society.

At this point it remains unclear whether or not NATO and Russia will be able to sign a "binding document" which will satisfy Russian security concerns. From this perspective, NATO expansion could quickly become either a very big problem involving remilitarization of Russia or a workable solution to the new European order including Russia in the mix.